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Oregon’s Medicaid Reform And Transition To Global Budgets 
Were Associated With Reductions In Expenditures
KJ McConnell, S Renfro, N Wallace, D Cohen, RC Lindrooth, and ME Chernew
Abstract
In 2012 Oregon initiated an ambitious delivery system reform, moving the majority of its 
Medicaid enrollees into sixteen coordinated care organizations, a type of Medicaid accountable 
care organization. Using claims data, we assessed measures of access, appropriateness of care, 
utilization, and expenditures for five service areas (evaluation and management, imaging, 
procedures, tests, and inpatient facility care), comparing Oregon to the neighboring state of 
Washington. Overall, the transformation into coordinated care organizations was associated with a 
7 percent relative reduction in expenditures across the sum of these services, attributable primarily 
to reductions in inpatient utilization. The change to coordinated care organizations also 
demonstrated reductions in avoidable emergency department visits and improvements in some 
measures of appropriateness of care, but also exhibited reductions in primary care visits, a 
potential area of concern. Oregon’s coordinated care organizations could provide lessons for 
controlling health care spending for other state Medicaid programs.
In 2012 Oregon initiated one of the nation’s most ambitious Medicaid delivery system 
reform efforts, creating sixteen coordinated care organizations (CCOs) to care for 90 percent 
of its Medicaid enrollees. CCOs can be considered a type of accountable care organization 
(ACO), acting as regional entities that are accountable for the health care quality and 
spending of a defined population.
However, Oregon’s CCO model differentiates itself from most ACO models in several 
dimensions.1 First, although CCOs originated from a mix of health plans and provider 
organizations, their financing is closer to a Medicaid managed care organization than a 
traditional Medicare ACO. In particular, while Medicare ACOs consist primarily of 
providers, CCOs include an administrative layer that accepts payment from the state, 
manages claims, pays providers, and carries financial risk. CCOs also have unique 
governance structures that include health care providers, community members, and 
stakeholders in the local health systems. CCOs manage a broad range of services, including 
physical health, dental care, mental health, and addiction treatment, and are responsible for 
coordinating these health services as well as the broader social service needs of their 
Medicaid populations. Finally, CCOs face upside and downside risk through a global budget. 
CCO global budgets are risk-adjusted, prospective payments made by the state to the CCO. 
They are intended to cover total expected spending of the CCO’s patient population over a 
broad continuum of care for a defined period. Within the global budget, CCOs have 
flexibility on how they spend their dollars and are not confined to services narrowly defined 
as “medically necessary.” This flexibility creates opportunities for CCOs to invest in 
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services that may address social determinants of health in ways that could be more effective 
than the typical scope of care provided by physicians and hospitals.
CCOs have engaged in a variety of innovative efforts to change the delivery of care for their 
Medicaid patients. These strategies include incentives to enroll patients in primary care 
homes; the use of data in new ways to target high-risk patients; the integration of behavioral 
health services in primary care sites; care transition programs for emergency department 
(ED) patients or patients admitted to inpatient settings; increased training and employment 
of community health workers; pilot programs designed to test new ways to care for high-risk 
groups; and the use of flexible funds to support social services that are intended to improve 
health and reduce the use of the medical care system. A $45 million State Innovation Model 
grant from the Center for Medicare and Medicaid Innovation supported the movement to 
coordinated care and facilitated the formation of a Transformation Center, a clearinghouse 
for sharing innovations and providing technical assistance and transformation funds for 
CCOs.
The Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services provided an additional $1.9 billion to 
support the CCO model. In exchange, Oregon made a commitment to reduce its rate of 
annual spending growth from 5.4 percent to 3.4 percent within three years and to achieve 
these savings without diminishing the quality of care. A failure to meet these benchmarks 
would trigger financial penalties for the state.
To date, reports from the Oregon Health Authority about the CCOs have been positive, 
indicating lower expenditures, reductions in use, and improvements in quality associated 
with the adoption of the model.2,3 A recent comparison of Oregon’s and Colorado’s 
Medicaid ACO initiatives identified positive trends for both programs, with similar 
performance across both states.4 In this study we sought to more explicitly identify the 
effects of Oregon’s CCO model on spending and quality two years after implementation 
through a comparison with the Medicaid population in Washington State, a state with similar 
demographics to Oregon and without expansive delivery system reforms during the study 
period.
Study Data And Methods
Study Population
The study population included people enrolled in Medicaid from January 2011 through 
December 2014, enrolled for at least three months within a twelve-month window. We 
selected a three-month window as it is accommodates the enrollment and disenrollment 
patterns that are frequent among Medicaid members, while excluding very small enrollment 
periods that can exhibit a high degree of variability in health spending that is 
uncharacteristic of typical Medicaid utilization. Other enrollment periods were analyzed in 
our sensitivity analyses discussed below. We excluded people who were newly enrolled in 
2014 as part of the Affordable Care Act’s Medicaid expansion. We also excluded people 
who were dually eligible for both Medicare and Medicaid. In Oregon, we excluded 
Medicaid enrollees who were not enrolled in CCOs because of special health needs and 
enrollees from one CCO (Cascade Health Alliance) that did not launch until August 2013. 
McConnell et al. Page 2
Data for two related CCOs (PacificSource Central and PacificSource Gorge) were combined, 
resulting in fourteen CCOs for study.
Medicaid enrollees in Washington State served as our comparison population. Washington’s 
Medicaid program exhibited many similarities to Oregon’s program. Like Oregon, the 
program was predominantly based on managed care arrangements and also engaged in a 
Medicaid expansion in 2014. Washington did not undergo major delivery system changes 
during the study period, but it did experiment with some reform efforts. The most prominent 
of these reforms included its Health Home initiative and its “ER is for Emergencies” 
program. The Health Home program was initiated in 2013, targeting high-risk Medicaid 
enrollees, to provide appointment assistance, identify gaps in care, and connect clients to a 
broad range of health and social services.5 The program was implemented in select areas of 
the state and did not include any shared savings or downside risk components. Washington’s 
“ER is for Emergencies” program was initiated in 2012 and focused on improved 
communication and integration among providers and hospitals, patient care plans for 
frequent users, and guidelines to reduce narcotic-seeking behavior.6
We obtained Medicaid physical health claims and enrollment information from the Oregon 
Health Authority and the Washington State Health Care Authority. In Washington, 
behavioral health claims are managed separately as part of the Department of Social and 
Health Services. Thus, we excluded behavioral health–related outcomes and risk factors in 
our analysis.
Study Design
We used a difference-in-differences approach to isolate the effect of Oregon’s CCO 
transformation, with data from 2011 serving as the preintervention period, 2012 serving as a 
transition year, and 2013 and 2014 serving as the postintervention period. We decomposed 
the average two-year effect on outcomes into year-one and year-two effects. Our analyses of 
expenditures assessed differences across patient types (adults or children; high-risk or low-
risk patients) and CCO characteristics (rural or urban location; for-profit status; and CCOs 
with previous experience in managing risk-based contracts). We analyzed publicly available 
documents derived from the CCO certification process to identify CCOs with previous 
contracting relationships or with for-profit status.
Variables
In Oregon’s and Washington’s managed care and CCO environments, capitation and other 
alternative payment mechanisms create “encounter” claims, which include information on 
diagnosis and procedure but record the amount paid as “zero.” Estimates of expenditures 
based purely on “paid” amounts would undercount any services paid outside of a fee-for-
service system, because the capitation payment is not captured in the data.
As a proxy for expenditures, we created measures of standardized expenditures for services 
that used a common set of procedure or service codes across both states. These services 
included inpatient facility care and four categories of service in the Berenson-Eggers Type of 
Service (BETOS) classification. BETOS categories have been used to categorize claims on 
the basis of clinically meaningful groupings of procedures and services. All procedure codes 
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are assigned to one of seven BETOS categories: evaluation and management, procedures, 
imaging, tests, durable medical equipment, other, and exceptions and unclassified.
To create a measure of standardized expenditures, we repriced claims in four BETOS areas 
(evaluation and management, imaging, tests, and procedures) by attaching Oregon 2014 
Medicaid fee schedule rates to claims in both states according to procedure and site-of-
service codes. We repriced inpatient facility services on a per diem basis. These 
“standardized expenditures” represent typical Medicaid expenditures for common services 
across both states. Our measure of standardized expenditures was confined to a set of 
services that accounted for approximately 38 percent of total spending on medical services 
(see online Appendix Exhibit 1).7 We also assessed utilization in terms of ED visits, primary 
care visits, and acute inpatient days.
We assessed two measures of access constructed from the Healthcare Effectiveness Data and 
Information Set (HEDIS):8 children’s access to preventive or ambulatory health services 
(individuals ages 1–6 who had an ambulatory or preventive care visit during the year) and 
the percentage of adults ages 20–44 who had an ambulatory or preventive care visit during 
the year. We assessed changes in quality by estimating changes in “potentially avoidable” 
ED visits9 and preventable hospitalizations as defined by the Agency for Healthcare 
Research and Quality’s Prevention Quality Indicators.10 We also analyzed performance on 
five measures of appropriateness or “low-value” care (appropriate medications for people 
with asthma; testing for children with pharyngitis; imaging studies for low back pain; 
imaging for uncomplicated headache; and avoidance of unnecessary cervical cancer 
screening), hypothesizing that these services might be areas of focus for organizations 
seeking to reduce spending and improve quality.11,12
Statistical Analysis
Our analysis was conducted at the member-quarter level. We analyzed utilization outcomes 
in terms of rates per thousand member-months and standardized expenditures as per member 
per month amounts. We used a multivariate linear model with propensity weights calculated 
using age, sex, Chronic Illness and Disability Payment System (CDPS) risk indicators, and 
rurality. Propensity weights were applied across the Oregon and Washington populations for 
all study periods, with each individual in each time period given a weight proportional to the 
probability of being in the Oregon Medicaid program in the fourth quarter of 2011, prior to 
the CCO intervention (see the Appendix Exhibit 3).7 These weights were intended to adjust 
for observable differences between the Oregon and Washington populations, as well as 
changes in the composition of each population over time.13
Our model adjusted for sex, age, CDPS risk categories, rurality, quarter (to control for 
seasonality), and included an indicator for the postintervention period (2013–14) and the 
interaction between the Oregon population and postintervention indicators, which produced 
our estimates of the policy effects. Standard errors were adjusted for clustering at the 
primary care service area level.14,15
We tested the assumption of parallel trends for standardized expenditures in the treatment 
and comparison groups in the pre period.16,17 Measures of access, quality, and low-value 
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care required one-year lookbacks and were restricted to continuously enrolled individuals 
with annual assessments in 2011, 2013, and 2014.
We conducted a number of sensitivity analyses. We tested the impacts of: excluding 
propensity score weights; restricting the population to individuals enrolled in both the 
preintervention and postintervention periods; restricting the study population to individuals 
with longer enrollment periods; using diagnosis related group–based pricing approaches (as 
opposed to per diem inpatient pricing approaches); and including the 2012 “transition” 
period as part of the analysis. (These are available in Appendix Exhibits 4–6.)7 Analyses 
used Stata software, version 14.2, and R, version 3.1.2. The Institutional Review Boards of 
Oregon Health and Science University and Washington State approved this research.
Limitations
Our study had a number of limitations. Our measure of standardized expenditures was 
confined to a relatively narrow set of services and excluded, for example, behavioral health 
services, durable medical equipment, nonemergency transport, and prescription drugs—all 
important areas for Medicaid enrollees. These services were excluded because differences in 
each state’s data systems did not allow for a straightforward comparison of use or spending. 
Although our measure of standardized expenditures captured many of the most common 
services—primary care, ED, and inpatient and outpatient hospital care—we estimate that 
they accounted for approximately 38 percent of total medical expenditures. It is possible that 
overall expenditure trends in Oregon and Washington differed from our measure of 
standardized expenditures. We excluded any consideration of expenditures for long-term 
care, which were not included as part of the CCO global budget.
Our measure of standardized expenditures, which used the Oregon 2014 Medicaid fee 
schedule, acted as a proxy for utilization but might have obscured changes in expenditures 
that were driven by higher or lower reimbursement rates. In addition, our estimates did not 
factor in additional payments to providers in the form of bonus payments for quality targets.
Our difference-in-differences estimates were based on a comparison of the Oregon program 
to trends in one other state. The prevalence of the Health Home and “ER is for Emergencies” 
reform efforts in Washington—both of which have reported success in reducing utilization5,6
— suggests that our comparison group was not a strict “business as usual” comparison, and 
success in these programs might bias estimates of CCO reform impacts (relative to no 
intervention) toward zero.
Oregon has had a long history of experimenting with innovative approaches to constraining 
costs in its Medicaid program. The Oregon Health Plan, created in 1993, attempted to 
expand coverage to all Oregonians with incomes below 100 percent of the federal poverty 
level but constrain costs through a “prioritized list” of disease-treatment services that the 
Medicaid program would cover. The state has also worked to disseminate evidence-based 
practices as a mechanism of constraining costs, using its Health Evidence Review 
Commission to conduct systematic reviews and develop evidence-based practice guidelines 
for clinicians and serve as the basis for what will be covered under the benefit package for 
Medicaid enrollees.
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Although the CCOs received bonus payments for meeting certain quality metrics,1 we did 
not analyze performance on these metrics, because many rely on electronic health records or 
survey data for which there were no comparison measures in Washington. Finally, our 
measures of access, quality, and low-value care did not capture all aspects of quality or the 
patient experience.
Study Results
Utilization And Standardized Expenditures In Years 1 And 2
Exhibit 1 describes characteristics of the CCO model in Oregon. There were 745,672 
Oregon Medicaid enrollees and 1,759,555 Washington Medicaid enrollees in our analyses. 
After propensity score weighting, both populations exhibited similar clinical and 
demographic characteristics. (See Appendix Exhibit 3 eTable 2.)7
In the postintervention period, standardized expenditures across evaluation and management, 
imaging, procedures, tests, and inpatient care increased by $1 per member per month in 
Oregon and $7 per member per month in Washington (Exhibit 2). Overall, adjusted 
estimates indicated that the CCO intervention was associated with a $6.65 (p = 0.004) 
decrease in standardized expenditures per member per month, relative to what expenditures 
would have been without the intervention. This is equivalent to savings of 7 percent. Our 
tests for “parallel trends” in standardized expenditures did not indicate significant 
differences in trends in total expenditures prior to the intervention. (See Appendix Exhibit 
3.)7
The reduction in spending was attributable largely to differential trends in the use of 
inpatient care in Oregon after the CCO intervention (a relative decrease of $5.80, p = 0.002). 
However, Oregon also exhibited relative decreases in standardized expenditures for 
evaluation and management visits ($1.95, p = 0.03).
Standardized expenditures for imaging, procedures, and tests declined or were flat in both 
states, although Oregon exhibited a small but significant relative decrease in standardized 
expenditures for tests ($0.22, p = 0.04) and small but significant relative increases in 
standardized expenditures for imaging ($0.16, p = 0.04) and procedures ($1.17, p < 0.001) 
relative to Washington. In general performance on standardized expenditures was similar 
across years 1 and 2.
Exhibit 2 also displays changes in ED visits, primary care visits, inpatient days, and the 
inpatient admission rate. ED visits—a focus for both states—decreased over time, with 
Oregon exhibiting a significantly larger decrease in year 2 but no difference in the overall 
two-year average. Primary care visits decreased in Oregon but increased in Washington, with 
adjusted estimates indicating a difference of 23.92 visits per thousand member-months (p < 
0.001), a relative decrease of approximately 8 percent. This decrease was larger in year 2 
(31.25 visits per thousand member-months). Oregon also experienced a relative decrease in 
inpatient days after the CCO intervention (3.69 days per thousand member-months, p = 
0.002). The admission rate decreased in Oregon relative to Washington, but this decrease 
was statistically significant only in the second year.
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Savings attributable to the CCO transformation were concentrated in adults and in patients 
with risk scores in the highest quartile (Exhibit 3). Reductions in standardized expenditures 
for children or for people with lower CDPS risk scores were not statistically significant.
There were no marked differences across CCO categories: CCOs serving urban areas 
exhibited similar performance to those serving rural areas, CCOs with previous experience 
in risk sharing performed similar to those that were new to these arrangements, and for-
profit CCOs exhibited similar performance to not-for-profit CCOs (Exhibit 3).
Access, Quality, And Low-Value Care In Years 1 And 2
Access to care, as measured by HEDIS metrics, decreased in Oregon (Exhibit 4). Adjusted 
estimates indicate that children’s access to primary care declined by 1.1 percentage points (p 
= 0.005) and adults’ access to preventive ambulatory care declined by 3.0 percentage points 
(p < 0.001). Measures of avoidable ED visits declined in both Oregon and Washington, with 
Oregon demonstrating a slightly larger decrease (0.7 visits per thousand member-months, p 
= 0.001) in the two-year average across states. Overall preventable hospital admissions 
declined in Oregon, with a significant decrease in the first year of implementation (2.7 visits 
per thousand member-months, p = 0.04), although the overall two-year decrease was not 
statistically significant.
Relative to Washington, Oregon’s CCO transformation was associated with statistically 
significant improvements in two of five measures of low-value care (Exhibit 4). Avoidance 
of imaging for uncomplicated headache improved by 1.2 percentage points relative to 
Washington (p = 0.02), and avoidance of unnecessary cervical cancer screening improved by 
1.0 percentage point (p = 0.03). Our sensitivity analyses supported our main results. (See 
Appendix Exhibits 4–6x.)7
Discussion
Two years into its implementation, Oregon’s coordinated care organization model was 
associated with reductions in standardized expenditures for evaluation and management, 
procedures, tests, and inpatient services relative to Washington State’s Medicaid program. 
These reductions would be equivalent to savings of approximately 7 percentage points 
across the five service areas examined. The largest reductions were observed in the use of 
inpatient hospitalization. ED visits, which had been targeted through high-profile initiatives 
in each state, declined in both states, with no significant difference in the two-year average.
Standardized expenditures for evaluation and management visits grew less in Oregon 
relative to Washington, a finding consistent with our analysis of primary care use. Primary 
care visits increased in Washington but declined in Oregon, even though Oregon’s CCO 
model emphasized enrollment in a “primary care home” and other primary care access 
measures as part of the set of incentive metrics for which CCOs could be rewarded. This 
differential might reflect tightening primary care capacity in Oregon, potentially exacerbated 
by the 2014 Medicaid expansion. Between June 2011 and July 2014, Oregon increased its 
monthly enrollment by more than 450,000 people—an 84 percent increase.18 In comparison, 
during the same time period, Washington increased monthly enrollment by approximately 
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466,000 people—a 43 percent increase. The relatively larger increase in Oregon may have 
crowded out access to primary care for its Medicaid enrollees. These changes are further 
reflected in the access measures of Exhibit 4. Furthermore, even though these access 
measures decreased in Oregon, overall rates remained higher than the comparison state in 
the postintervention period. Nonetheless, access to primary care should be monitored 
closely. In addition, the larger Medicaid expansion in Oregon might have affected access to 
other specialists, which might have affected our estimates of spending on a variety of 
BETOS services.
Although markers of access decreased in Oregon, the state also reduced inpatient days, ED 
visits (overall and avoidable), and preventable hospitalizations. There are several possible 
explanations for these changes. First, CCOs engaged in a variety of nontraditional support 
services and transition programs that may have accounted for the reduction in ED and 
inpatient services, even if primary care visits went down. For example, CCOs substantially 
increased their use of community health workers, social workers, and care coordinators to 
engage their Medicaid enrollees outside of the clinic setting. These programs typically 
targeted adults and patients with multiple comorbidities, consistent with our finding that 
savings were primarily attributable to these groups.
Second, the CCO model includes flexibility to spend on health-related services that are not 
part of the traditional “medically necessary” medical care system. Thus, CCOs may have 
identified mechanisms to improve care and reduce spending, even if office visits for primary 
care decreased. For example, a recent study of supportive housing initiated with the CCO 
reform found reductions in overall health care use and expenditures among homeless people 
enrolled in the program.19 The decrease in standardized expenditures associated with the 
Oregon transformation suggests that the CCOs may have been effective in slowing health 
care spending relative to a neighboring state used as a control for this study.
The decrease in expenditures, attributable primarily to reductions in inpatient use, are similar 
to those observed in savings attributable to Medicare ACO models, in which savings were 
achieved in large part by reductions in expenditures related to hospitalizations.20–22
Evidence is now emerging on a variety of large-scale payment and delivery system reforms 
for Medicare patients.21–23 Less is known about the best ways to create high-value Medicaid 
programs. Some states, including Indiana, Arkansas, and Michigan, have emphasized 
consumer-driven tools as a way of controlling Medicaid costs. These states have introduced 
premiums, copayments, deductibles, and health savings–type accounts, tools that have been 
common and generally effective in commercially insured populations but have a less-
developed evidence base for the lower-income Medicaid population.24
Other states, like Oregon, have focused on changing the delivery systems through ACO-type 
models. In contrast to the Medicare program, Medicaid ACOs exhibit considerable 
heterogeneity. For example, Colorado’s Medicaid ACO program provides administrative 
support and per enrollee funding to seven Regional Care Collaborative Organizations to 
improve connections among Medicaid enrollees, providers, and community services, but the 
program does not formally incorporate upside or downside risk. New Jersey initiated a 
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program with three Medicaid ACOs with one-sided shared savings, with a goal of expanding 
the program and moving to two-sided, upside and downside risk-sharing arrangements later. 
An important task for state and federal policy makers will be to identify the relative 
effectiveness of consumer-based versus delivery system approaches in reforming state 
Medicaid programs.
Conclusion
Medicaid’s budgetary implications create an imperative to find new models that can control 
spending and improve the value of this public program. Estimating the impact of any one 
program is challenging because the comparison must be drawn from other states with their 
own unique features. Thus, assessing the effects of reforms will require multiple studies. 
With that caveat, our findings suggest that comprehensive system reforms can slow or 
reduce health care use in the early years of implementation for a Medicaid population. 
Oregon’s model—characterized by a large federal investment, accountability for 
coordinating care, and a global budget that integrates financing streams and allows for 
flexibility in how funds are spent—could provide lessons on controlling health care 
spending for other state Medicaid programs.
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Exhibit 3. 
Performance differences across population and coordinated care organization (CCO) 
characteristics, relative to Washington state comparison group.
Source/Notes: SOURCE Authors’ analysis of 2011–14 Medicaid claims data from Oregon 
and Washington State. NOTES The exhibit shows difference-in-differences estimates for 
different CCO groups and patient populations on standardized expenditures for four 
categories of service in the Berenson-Eggers Type of Service classification and inpatient 
facility services, per member per month. Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals. 
Risk-sharing contracts are arrangements between a payer and provider in which the provider 
assumes some or all of the financial risk associated with the patient and their health care 
utilization, as exemplified in capitation or subcapitation arrangements.
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